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Abstract
The federated identity model provides a solution for user authentication across
multiple administrative domains. The academic federations, such as the Brazilian
federation, are examples of this model in practice. The majority of institutions that
participate in academic federations employ password-based authentication for their
users, with an attacker only needing to find out one password in order to personify the
user in all federated service providers. Multi-factor authentication emerges as a solution
to increase the robustness of the authentication process. This article aims to introduce
a comprehensive and open source solution to offer multi-factor authentication for
Shibboleth Identity Providers. Based on the Multi-factor Authentication Profile
standard, our solution provides three extra second factors (One-Time Password, FIDO2
and Phone Prompt). The solution has been deployed in the Brazilian academic
federation, where it was evaluated using functional and integration testing, as well as
security and case study analysis.
Keywords: Multi-factor authentication, Federated identity management, Shibboleth
identity provider
1 Introduction
Identity proofing establishes that a subject is who they claim to be. Digital authentication
establishes that a subject attempting to access a digital service is in control of one or more
valid credentials associated with that subject’s digital identity [1].
The classic paradigm for authentication systems identifies three categories of authenti-
cation [1]: something you know (e.g., a password); something you have (e.g., a hardware
token); something you are (e.g., a fingerprint); and in [2] someone you know (e.g., social
network). There are advantages and drawbacks for each of the above categories that
can deny legitimate user access. Passwords can be forgotten, smart cards misplaced and
biometrics can become temporarily unavailable, such as, loss of voice or poor quality fin-
gerprint. Furthermore, biometrics is not secure if used as a single authentication factor
since it can be replicated (an attacker may obtain a copy of the subscriber’s fingerprint
and build a replica) [2].
Currently, password-based credentials are the most used by authentication mecha-
nisms, despite of their weaknesses [2, 3]. Users tend to use easy-to-guess passwords, use
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the same password in multiple accounts, write the passwords or store them in a insecure
way in their machines, etc. There are multiple opportunities for identity theft (the act
of impersonating users with stolen credentials) [1], and this problem has been receiving
increasing attention due to its high financial and social costs [4]. Moreover, attackers have
the option of using many techniques to steal passwords such as shoulder surfing, snoop-
ing, sniffing, guessing, phishing, social engineering, brute force attacks, bought leaked
passwords, etc [5].
The Federated Identity Management (FIM) model allows identity portability across
distinct domains [6]. In this model, the user only needs to authenticate with a single Iden-
tity Provider (IdP) to access different service providers (SP). The FIM model also offers
the convenience of Single Sign On (SSO), which allows the user to be authenticated in
his/her home identity provider only once, regardless of how many service providers will
be accessed. The Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) specifications [7] set is
prominent to develop identity management systems based on this model.
Identity theft is a serious concern in the FIM model since federated SSO simplifies the
job of the attackers. After a successful identity theft within a federation, attackers are pro-
vided with means to compromise resources of all federated service providers, potentially
leading to disclosure of sensitive data [8].
Multi-factor authentication (MFA), sometimes called Two Factor Authentication (2FA),
emerges as a solution to increase the robustness of the authentication process. MFA
combines more than one authentication factor chosen from independent credential cat-
egories, such as password and hardware token, or two or more factors from the same
category such as the case of One-Time Password (OTP). In this case, it is assumed that
even though an attacker compromises one of the factor, the level of protection is greater
due to the fact that the attacker needs to compromise the remaining factors. The benefits
of adopting MFA are to provide a resilient way of authenticating users and is considered
as one of the most cost-effective mechanisms [3].
The Shibboleth framework [9] uses SAML specifications, and it is the most adopted
solution in academic federations. In June of 2017, the REFEDS (Research and Education
FEDerations group) announced the REFEDS Multi-Factor Authentication Profile (MFA
Profile) [10] that defines a SAML authentication context to express MFA in SAML asser-
tions and specifies requirements that an authentication event must meet to communicate
the usage of MFA. Thus, this profile allows SPs to request user MFA from IdPs, and in
turn, the IdPs can notify SPs that MFA was successful.
However, existing non-proprietary MFA solutions in the Shibboleth IdP do not follow
this specification. Thus, resulting in different third party products with specific architec-
ture and implementations, which are usually not interoperable with other MFA solutions
and require customization effort in order to be adopted or upon new versions of the
Shibboleth framework.
This article aims to describe a comprehensive solution for Shibboleth IdPs so that they
are able to authenticate their users with multiple authentication factors. Our main con-
tribution is a consistent implementation of a multi-factor authentication architecture
for Shibboleth IdPs. The proposed solution is based on the MFA Profile standard [10],
which guarantees the interoperability with other multi-factor authentication solutions.
The solution was designed to have low coupling with the IdP, to be user-friendly, flexible
to the end-user and IdP operators, and extensible, which allows new technologies to be
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used as extra authentication factors. The lifecycle management of the second factor is also
supported in the proposed solution. A prototype was implemented and evaluated, con-
sidering four extra authentication factors: Time-base One-Time Password (TOTP) [11],
FIDO2 [12], Phone Prompt and Backup codes. Android and iOSmobile applications were
also developed to act as a 2FA for Phone Prompt technology. The evaluation consisted of
functional and integration testing, security and case study analysis.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 analyzes some related
work. The proposed solution and the developed prototype are described in Section 3
and the prototype evaluation is discussed in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 presents the
concluding remarks as well as future work suggestions.
2 Related work
In 1991 Weiser [13] presented the vision that the computer of the 21st century would
be mobile and ubiquitous. This vision became true mainly due to smartphones, which
from the point of view of information security, made it easier for the user to deal with
multi-factor authentication systems. In addition, they reduce the cost of manufacturing,
distributing, and storing tokens. In fact, many commercial solutions use smartphones to
receive short text messages or to execute OTP applications [5].
The use of telecom networks to send OTP has been considered insecure by NIST [1].
This led to the development of several solutions for MFA. Google Phone Prompt [14] is a
2FA standard for Google accounts that was created as a response to usability and security
issues in existing OTP products. This solution is exclusive for Google service users and
depends on smartphones and Internet connectivity. There are other companies that offer
a similar product such as Authy OneTouch from Authy, Push-to-Accept from Secureauth
[15] and DUO push [16] from DUO Security. All of which are proprietary solutions.
Although there are several products for MFA, to the best of our knowledge, there is not
a standardized way of integrating them into a Shibboleth IdP. Among MFA solutions for
the Shibboleth framework, it is possible to find: FAME [17];Multi-Context Broker (MCB)
[18]; Authentication Flow Selection [19]; and the practical experiment described in [20].
FAME framework [17] enables multi-factor and multilevel authentication in Shibboleth.
FAME adds the authentication factors Level of Assurance (LoA) in the generated SAML
assertion. This information will be used to apply the fine-grained access control later on.
However, the integration of FAME with Shibboleth requires the change of the Shibboleth
Handle Service, which is responsible to identify and authenticate the user. FAME was
released prior to MFA Profile publication, thus FAME does not offer support to MFA
Profile.
MCB [18] and Authentication Flow Selection [19] extended the authentication flow
from the Shibboleth IdP in order to allow the second-factor authentication. However,
when those were created, there was not a standard specification to indicate how to per-
form 2FA authentication and how to notify the SPs that a 2FA authentication was used.
Thus, these solutions do not guarantee the interoperability among them or with any other
MFA solution in Shibboleth IdPs. It is important to highlight that these solutions depend
on third-party solutions, such as DUO Security, not only for 2FA authentication but also
to offer the application that will be used as a second factor by the user.
In [20], the authors describe a practical experiment that integrates an external
password-less authentication system based on FIDO2 in the Shibboleth framework. In
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the proposed solution, the Shibboleth IdP redirects the user client (browser) to the FIDO2
server. At this phase, the user gets authenticated locally on his or her device (e.g.Windows
Hello biometric authentication) and the authentication result is translated to the FIDO2
server. If authentication is successful, the FIDO2 server then redirects the client back to
the IdP, which then issue the SAML assertion with the user’s attributes to the SP. This
approach provides single factor authentication using FIDO2, however, it does not offer a
multiple factor authentication solution.
Different from the approaches presented above, our proposal is a comprehensive open
source solution that does not change the Shibboleth framework. Based on the REFEDS
MFA Profile, our approach offers components to extend the Shibboleth IdP authentica-
tion flows to support multiple factors, leveraging the MFA Profile specification to express
information about the multi factor authentication in SAML assertions. In this way, we
guarantee interoperability between different products that follow the MFA Profile, while
supporting different authentication factors to be plugged into a Shibboleth IdP. In fact, to
the best of our knowledge, our approach is the first and comprehensive open source solu-
tion to offer multi-factor authentication for Shibboleth Identity Providers. The following
section details the developed solution in this work.
3 Multi-Factor authentication in shibboleth identity providers
The Shibboleth framework [21], which implements the SAML specification, has been
used by several research and education (R&E) federations around the world, and until
2017, there was not a standard to offer multi-factor authentication to Shibboleth IdPs.
From version 3.3 the Shibboleth framework included support for multi-factor authen-
tication, however a functional implementation that allows MFA is not provided. In our
proposal, we have used the MFA Profile [10] specified by REFEDS, developing a con-
crete implementation for adding MFA into Shibboleth IdPs, making them capable of
interoperating with existing solutions that implement the SAML specification.
According to the MFA Profile specification, SPs now have the option of requesting IdP
to perform multi-factor authentication of its users, or to completely ignore how users
are authenticated. Our proposal allows a seamless integration with SPs in both scenarios.
The later scenario means that SPs are not aware if the user was authenticated on an IdP
using one or two factors, or even which technology was used as the second factor. On the
other hand, in the case multi-factor authentication is a mandatory requirement by the SP,
the MFA Profile allows SPs and IdPs to express such information as part of the messages
exchanged between them.
Figure 1 presents a high-level view of our proposed solution. TheMulti-Factor Provider
(MFaP) – themain component of this proposal – is a Java application that can be deployed
Fig. 1 Component diagram of Multi-Factor Provider (MFaP)
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on any Java application server (e.g., the same server where Shibboleth IdP is deployed, or
in a different computer). The interaction between theMFaP and the IdP is done through a
REST interface provided by the former and the authentication flow scripts [19] by the lat-
ter. We developed a MFaProviderIdP library to be deployed in the Shibboleth IdP, which
is used by IdP authentication flows to invoke theMFaP application.We are aware that it is
difficult to setup, deploy and maintain an identity provider within a production environ-
ment. Thus, the current proposal has a loose coupling from the identity provider point of
view.
The Shibboleth framework uses Spring Web Flow to orchestrate IdP’s business logic
that includes the user authentication process. In the authentication flow, it is possible to
perform steps such as: how to collect user credentials; how to validate that credentials;
or even how to request extra credentials. A Shibboleth IdP can implement one or more
authentication flows where each flow can have its own sub-flows or interact with other
authentication flows at the same level. Thus, an authentication request is handled by one
authentication flow that can invoke its sub-flows or another authentication flow and, at
the end, the IdP produces an Authentication Result [22].
The IdP authentication flow (MFAAuthFlows in Fig. 1) is one of the XML configuration
files of a Shibboleth IdP, where it is possible to write rules combining different authentica-
tion factors that result in a combined sequence of challenges. In this way, the modification
of an IdP for inclusion of MFaP follows standard Shibboleth administration practices for
its deployment, update and maintenance. In this proposal, the MFA AuthFlow XML is
the place where the Shibboleth IdP consumes the REST interface provided by the MFaP
(see Manager and MFA AuthFlows components on Fig. 1). We used REST for this com-
munication in order to allow the loose coupling between the MFaP and the Shibboleth
IdP.
The user and the IdP operator flexibility is the core of our solution. MFaP was designed
to allow the use of different types of technologies as the second factor. Thus, the IdP oper-
ator is able to choose which technologies will be offered to provide support. Additionally,
each user has the opportunity to enable the second-factor authentication on the user’s
account and to choose which IdP supported technologies will be his/her second factor.
Currently, the Manager component in Fig. 1 is able to work with four different tech-
nologies to act as extra authentication factors: Phone Prompt, TOTP, FIDO2 and Backup
codes. Nevertheless, as previously mentioned, our solution can easily be extended to
incorporate other authentication factors. This is achieved by following the strategy design
pattern. This way, we have defined an abstract Java interface that is consumed by the
Manager component. Thus, the addition of a new factor corresponds to the deployment,
in the MFaP, of a Java class that implements this interface and acts as an entry point for
the desired authentication factor and the respective XML configuration at the Shibboleth
IdP. It is essential to mention that no changes are needed in the REST API provided by the
MFaP or the MFaProviderIdP library, deployed in the IdP. Also, any information about
selecting a particular authentication factor is done following the MFA Profile specifica-
tion (through the XML configuration) and passed as parameters between the IdP and the
MFaP.
MFaPGUI component in Fig. 1 provides a dashboard (see Fig. 2) where users can enable
or disable their second factors. The MFaP GUI is a service provider that has an unique
trust relationship with the Shibboleth IdP where theMFaP was deployed. Thus, the access
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Fig. 2 Second factor life-cycle management provided by MFaP Dashboard
to the dashboard page will be granted only to users authenticated by this specific IdP.
TheMFaP GUI dashboard provides a modular graphical interface. Each extra factor tech-
nology has its own card (a visual component) on the dashboard. The IdP’s operator can
determine which MFaP supported technologies he or she wants to enable to his or her
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users. It can be done by switching some lines in the MFaP configuration file to true or
false.
Even though the IdP performs user authentication, user data such as username, pass-
word hash, etc. are usually stored in a database that is shared by other institution’s
information system. For example, LDAP is the most common solution to store user cre-
dentials that are used in authentication processes. Some institutions also use LDAP to
store a rich set of attributes for their users such as address, the institutions’ affiliations,
department, school, etc. Other may use relational database to store such kind of infor-
mation. Our proposed solution provides an uniform layer for persistence (Persistence DB
component in Fig. 1) that abstracts away from the underlying database technology used
by the institution. The current implemented solution usesMongoDB – aNoSQL database
– to store information related to extra authentication factors for each user. Thus, if the
institution chooses to keep all the information about its users in an unique database solu-
tion (for example, in its current LDAP), it can easily do so by to extending the Persistence
DB layer using this database solution.
We have developed a mobile app called AMPToAPP for both Android and iOS
platforms to support Phone Prompt authentication technology. AMPToAPP has been
designed to support more than one user account in a single or multiple IdPs. Its current
implementation allows the use of Phone Prompt as authentication factors, being ready to
use without any modification by any institution that deploys MFaP. Nevertheless, it can
be easily modified for using institutional branding, for instance. The source code of our
solution is under Apache License 2.0, and it is available in a Git repository1.
In the sequence, we describe each of the supported technologies for multi-factor
authentication currently supported by MFaP.
3.1 Time-based one-time password – (TOTP)
Currently, the most implemented 2FA method uses OTP acquired from SMS, phone calls
or mobile applications. The TOTP [11] standard is used by several 2FA solutions and
smartphones has helped its rise. The TOTP smartphone application is a cheap solution
and it can be deployed easily because almost everyone has a smartphone and TOTP
applications (Android or iOS) can be downloaded for free.
Smartphone TOTP applications have as advantage the possibility to use a unique appli-
cation to manage all user TOTP tokens for different institutions; a lot of users already use
TOTP applications on their smartphones; and it is also possible to use it even when there
is no Internet connection.
TOTP has been implemented using the GoogleAuth [23] library, a Java server side
library that implements functionalities to create TOTP shared secrets and to generate and
verify TOTP passwords. In our implementation the TOTP module is composed by two
main classes: TOTPFactor (model) and TOTPService (service).
The TOTPFactor contains following attributes:
• sharedKey – Shared secret between client and server. The secret is generated in
the MFaP and shared with the client through a QR code using an app like Google
Authenticator or Authy;
1https://git.rnp.br/GT-AMPTo/mfap-installation-guide
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• timeStep – Regular time interval in which the generated one-time password is
valid. The RFC 6238 [11] recommendation is 30 seconds, in order to balance security
and usability. The GoogleAuth library uses this recommended interval as a fixed
value, however the TOTPFactor entity implements this attribute aiming to enable
configuration of future library updates or library exchange;
• lastCodeUsed – A one-time password can only be used once. Thus, this attribute
stores the last valid used code to avoid subsequent requests reusing the same code;
• usedAt – A hash algorithm is used in the calculation performed to generate the
one-time password and therefore a collision, even with very low probability, may
eventually occur - a valid one-time password that is the same as the last one used, but
at a different time interval. Therefore, in addition to saving the last one-time
password used, the instant in which it was used is also saved.
The service layer class has been implemented in order to be exchangeable to any other
library that implements TOTP algorithm, as long as it keeps the same signature for the
methods used in the web layer.
The authentication process using TOTP technology is illustrated by Fig. 3. In step 1, the
user enters his/her first factor credential. The IdP verifies that the user has 2FA enabled
and sends an authentication request to the MFaP (step 2). The MFaP then presents the
user with a Web page requesting the OTP code (step 3). At this point the user needs to
search and open the TOTP application in his/her smartphone, check the temporary num-
ber on the screen and type it on the IdPWeb page (step 4) before this code expires (which
usually happens in 30 seconds). The MFaP receives the code (Step 5) and verify it, and
in case of successful authentication, returns a response to the IdP (step 6) for finishing
the authentication process. It is important to notice that, since it generates an authenti-
cation code based on a previously exchanged secret key and the current time, the TOTP
application does not need to communicate with the MFaP in order to authenticate the
user.
Fig. 3 Authentication process using TOTP as the second factor
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3.2 Phone prompt
Second factor authentication usually provides a negative impact over usability, such as
the need to open the TOTP application and manually type the generated number into the
Web page. It is usually the case where the code expires whilst the user is still typing it.
Solutions that rely on Phone prompt, also called push dialog, aim to increase the
robustness of the authentication process with a minor impact on the usability. This 2FA
technology is based on the user receiving a notification on his/her smartphone, which
opens a prompt with a simple question: Are you trying to authenticate right now? (Yes or
No). It is more user friendly compared to the TOTP solution.
The implementation of the Phone prompt solution requires an application on smart-
phone and a message queue service to intermediate the communication between the IdP
and the mobile application on the user’s device. The Google Firebase Cloud Messaging
(FCM) [24] offers a reliable service to exchange messages with Android, iOS or evenWeb
applications. In this work, we have developed a mobile application for Android and iOS
and both of them use FCM to exchange messages with our MFaP.
The authentication process message exchange is illustrated by Fig. 4. In step 1, the user
enters his/her first factor credential. The IdP verifies that the user has Phone Prompt as
his/her 2FA and it then sends an authentication request to the MFaP (step 2). The MFaP
generates a nonce and sends a message to the user device through FCM (steps 3 and
4). The Phone Prompt application goes to the foreground on user’s device and the user
presses the YES button. The FCM sends the user’s response to the MFaP (step 5) and to
the IdP (step 6) where the authentication process is finished.
Fig. 4 Authentication process using Phone Prompt as the second factor
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3.3 FIDO2
The Fast IDentity Online (FIDO) Alliance, together with the World Wide Web Consor-
tium (W3C), developed open standards to create a strong user authentication solution
based on public key cryptography, to be user friendly, and to preserve user privacy, which
can also be used as a 2FA authentication method.
The FIDO Universal Second Factor (U2F) specification [25] allows the second factor
authentication without the use of a sophisticated device that requires energy source such
as a smartphone. FIDO Universal Authentication Framework (UAF) specification [26]
allows a password-less experience. That is, the user does not need a password as a first
factor or even as a second factor. The user is authenticated locally in the device using
his/her biometrics, and this authentication is transposed to remote services (relying party
– RP) through the protocols of the FIDO specification. FIDOAlliance proposes a solution
strongly based on the trust of RP over the user device being used during the authenti-
cation. In this case, the user device (tablet, smartphone, smartwatch, or even a personal
computer) must be certified by FIDO Alliance.
Based on the FIDO UAF and FIDO U2F standards, Web Authentication (WebAuthn)
[12] and Client to Authenticator Protocol (CTAP) [27] emerged under the term FIDO2.
They are today an industry standard for robust authentication. In this work, we choose it
to offer a 2FA option that does not depend on, a smartphone or even a 2FA device that
relies on an Internet connection.
The WebAuthN specification defines a standard API that has been built into the
major Web browsers and platforms to allow online services to use FIDO authentica-
tion. Together with the FIDO CTAP [27], it allows external devices such as smartphones
or USB tokens to use WebAuthN and become authenticators for desktop and web
applications. In this way, the browser uses the USB key to authenticate the user.
The FIDO2 specifications support different authentication scenarios, with varying
devices, such as keys, smartphones and smartwatches, communicating through USB,
Bluetooth, or NFC. Currently, MFaP supports only one associate FIDO2 USB key per
user account. Therefore, it is possible to use the same FIDO2 USB Key in different MFaP
accounts.
Our implementation of FIDO2 WebAuthn is based on the Yubico webauthn server
demo [28]. It provides a Java library that has been used as the core of MFaP FIDO2 mod-
ule REST API. Our API is based on the WebAuthnRestResource class, and includes
all relying party operations provided by JavaWebAuthnServer library, such as, generating
authentication challenges and verifying responses, registration, login and deletion. These
operations, and the general business logic of FIDO2 module are implemented by the
WebAuthnServer class. We have also implemented the CredentialRepository
interface to allow the use of our Persistence DB abstraction layer for storing keys and
other information related to FIDO2.
The authentication process using FIDO2 WebAuthn as the second factor is demon-
strated in Fig. 5. In the first step, the user provides his/her first factor (username and
password) on the Shibboleth IdP login page. The IdP interacts with MFaP and confirms
that the user has FIDO2 enabled as his/her second factor. Then, IdP/MFaP provides to the
user a Web page with an embedded WebAuthn JavaScript routine, where a FIDO2 chal-
lenge is generated (step 2). The user’s browser WebAuthn API is triggered and it shows
the WebAuthn authentication dialog, where the user is requested to connect his/her USB
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Fig. 5 Authentication process using a FIDO2 USB device as the second factor
key and touch on its physical button (steps 3 and 4). The USB key generates the response
to the challenge and sends it to user’s browser (step 5). The user’s browser forwards the
response to the IdP/MFaP (step 6). Finally, MFaP verifies that the response is correct and
the authentication process is successfully concluded, and the user is redirected to the SP
web page.
3.4 Backup codes
Printed backup codes are usually used by many commercial service providers as a last
resort for users, who have 2FA enabled to recover access to their accounts. In our solution,
when the user associates a second factor to his/her account, a set with ten disposable
codes is generated automatically, and the user is invited to print or save them in a file.
Backup codes are generated byMFaP using the same library of the TOTP (GoogleAuth).
Each disposable code can be used only once, andMFaP keeps track of those backup codes
and when they were used, so the user can manage what codes have already been used and
how many are still left. The user could generate a new set of codes when the current one
runs out (a pencil icon close to the Backup codes in Fig. 2).
Although backup codes only act as a second factor and can not be used separately
from the first factor, these should be kept in a safe place. Otherwise, an attacker, who
obtains them and who already knows the victim’s first factor, will be able to impersonate
him/her. This condition is not exclusive of the current proposal and it is present in many
commercial service providers, which relies on backup codes as a second factor.
It is important to notice that backup codes are not intended to be used as a regular
second factor, but as a safety measure for the case of losing or not having access to the
token device. Thus, it should be treated as a last resort before interacting with a human
support operator.
4 Second factor life-cycle management
MFaP has been designed as a comprehensive solution for IdP operators, and thus has
included aspects related to the life-cycle management of second factor. Suchmanagement
is composed by events such as, registration, replacement and revocation. The procedure
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adopted by an organization to handle each one of these events will directly impact the
robustness of its user authentication process. In this work, we assume that the first factor
of each MFaP’s user consists in the tuple (username, password). These are the same cre-
dentials that allow user to have access to his institutional email account, a typical scenario
for academic federations.
In this proposal, the second factor’s registration is done through a self-service pro-
vided by MFaP (See Fig. 2). From the user’s perspective, the MFaP Dashboard is a service
provider as any other service provider who delegates the authentication to IdP. Thus, an
user has to use his first factors to access the MFaP Dashboard if this user does not yet
have a second factor associated with his/her account. Otherwise, the user should use the
first and second factor to have access to the dashboard.
The registration of the TOTP is based on a QR code – presented on the MFaP web
page – scanned by the user containing the private key that will act as seed for generating
authentication codes. After that, the user needs to type in the generated code to confirm
the registration process with MFaP. For the Phone Prompt registration process the user
selects Phone Prompt as the second factor and the MFaP dashboard provides a QR Code,
which contains amongst other information the MFaP’s application key on FCM service.
The user then reads2 the QR Code using the AMPToApp and it sends a message to the
MFaP using FCM. After that, both MFaP and the AMPToApp show a successful regis-
tration message. For the FIDO2 WebAuthN registration, the user selects FIDO2 as the
second factor, inserts the FIDO2 token in the USB port and click the registration button
on theWeb page. Once the token starts flashing, the user has to touch the physical button
on the token. Employing the FIDO2 protocol and the standard Web API, the MFaP then
exchange cryptographic keys with the USB device and registers it in its database.
If a malicious entity has access to the first factor of its victim and this victim had not
yet registered a second factor to his/her account, it could explore this self-service to asso-
ciate a second factor to the victim account and the latter will not be able to access his/her
account anymore. In that case, the victim will have to contact IT support of his/her insti-
tution and ask them to remove the second factor associated with his/her account and then
the user should redefine his/her password.
MFaP allows users to register more than one technology as his/her extra authentication
factor and the user can choose which will be the default technology in the authentica-
tion process. The other technologies will act as backup or convenience options that can
be selected by the user at anytime. In the example of Fig. 2, the user has three enabled
technologies where the Phone Prompt is the default technology and it can be observed
because of the filled bookmark icon in the Phone Prompt card and also the left green bor-
der. If the user wants to use the FIDO2 as the default, then, he/she has to click on the
FIDO2 bookmark icon. Backup codes can not be the default technology.
The recovery process aims to give back the access to the user who lost his/her creden-
tials. If the user has only a first factor enabled, then it is possible to send to him/her a
link by email where the user will be able to reset and create a new password. However,
if the user loses access to the second factor, this procedure is not suitable. MFaP follows
NIST recommendation [29] for such situation, where the user should register more than
one option to acts as the second factor, thus, the user will have a backup option for the
2The user has 1 min to read the code before it expires.
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2FA process. In case the user does not have any factor, he/she will be locked out from the
account and need to contact IdP’s operator for manual recovery procedure.
The replacement of a second factor could be motivated by the acquisition of a new
mobile phone. In the current proposal, in order to replace the current second factor, the
user should use the same self service that he/she used to associate a second factor to the
account. In that case, the user should use the first factor and the current second factor to
gain access to the MFaP Dashboard and then, he/she is able to revoke the current second
factor (see trash can icon in Fig. 2) and associate a new one to the account.
Finally, the current solution also offers a command line interface where the MFaP’s
operator is able to remove the second factor associated with any user account.
5 Evaluation
In order to evaluate MFaP we have performed a series of experiments, looking at differ-
ent aspects of our solution. All experiments were performed using the GidLab testbed3
[30], where a set of identity and service providers were deployed over the GidLab infras-
tructure. Our solution has been deployed and validated on the following environments:
Ubuntu Linux 16.04 LTS, Shibboleth IdP version 3.3.1 and Shibboleth SP version 2.6.0.
We start by considering an IdP operator point of view in deploying MFaP into an exist-
ing IdP. In the sequence we discuss about a series of functional tests, followed by a security
analysis on the different factors supported by MFaP.
5.1 Deploying MFaP into existing IdPs
This section presents a brief discussion on the deployment of MFaP into an existing
IdP. This has been done to evaluate the impact of employing MFaP into the activities
associated with the management of an IdP.
The Brazilian National Research and Education Network (RNP - Rede Nacional de
Ensino e Pesquisa) is the entity who manages and supports the Brazilian Federated Aca-
demic Community (CAFe - Comunidade Acadêmica Federada). RNP offers a set of
procedures, scripts and an IdP template – a virtual machine image – to help institutions
to be part of CAFe.
In this work, we have used as basis the RNP IdP template to developed a set of Python
scripts for helping with the MFaP installation process. Thus, to install MFaP into a com-
puter where the IdP is running, the IdP administrator should execute our Python script,
answer a few questions and the script will download MFaP code from RNP git server,
generate a set of configurations files and deploy the MFaP application on local Apache
Tomcat server. After that, the MFaP will be completely integrated with Shibboleth IdP.
The same Python script could be used to get and apply MFaP code updates. To update
MFaP code, the IdP administrator should execute the script and at this time he/she
does not need to answer more questions because the configurations files were already
generated during the MFaP installation.
The initial assessment of the installation script has been performed through a series of
experiments using the GidLab infrastructure. Those allowed us to identify and fix some
issues with the IdP template provided by the RNP and with our installation script. Such
3GidLab is an experimental testbed for identity management solutions maintained by RNP.
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issues were related to the way the IdP image was built by the RNP and the way the instal-
lation script automated the process. For instance, a self-signed certificate was available in
that image, requiring that the curl command included the necessary flag to ignore that.
Also, the communication between the IdP and the MFaP is over TLS, requiring an extra
step of adding that certificate to the Java Virtual Machine trust store, to be reliable by the
application. Another issue was related to name resolution. The IdP was not able to make
requests to its own localhost address, to communicate with the MFaP that was running in
the same machine. This was because the file was configured in the image to use 127.0.1.1
resolving the hostname. And according to Debian documentation for a permanent IP
address system, a permanent IP address should be used instead of 127.0.1.1.
To certify that the installation script works properly, we had run a pilot phase involving
three Brazilian Universities (UFBA - Federal University of Bahia, UFPE - Federal Univer-
sity of Pernambuco and UFRGS -Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul) and the RNP.
Each IdP administrator employed our installation script to install and update MFaP. All
four IdPs were successfully integrated with MFaP and no impact has been noticed on the
other systems maintained by the institutions that rely on the IdP for authentication. As a
result of this experiment we collected relevant feedback that helped us to improve and to
fix a minor problem in our installation script.
5.2 Functional testing
The functional tests were performed in two phases: a set of tests conducted by the devel-
opment team; and some preliminary trials involving deployed pilots at one Brazilian
University and at RNP.
The tests conducted by the development team explored the GidLab testbed. We have
created a test plan to evaluate all 2FA technologies implemented by MFaP and all aspects
of the second factor life-cycle management for each technology. The test plan contains a
total of 38 functional tests of the complete solution, and allowed us to identify and per-
form some improvements to the final solution before it is made available. Those ranged
from visualization of the authentication factors under different configurations of reg-
istered factors, the different activities related to life-cycle management, and the actual
authentication using the four factors currently implemented.
In our current implementation the mobile app (AMPToApp) can act as a second factor
authentication for more than one account in a single or multiple IdPs. A set of tests were
performed using a mobile device with a single app and it was possible to successfully
validate the expected behavior considering multiple accounts in one or more IdPs. In
another set of tests, three mobile devices were used simultaneously where it was possible
to verify the solution behavior when there were concurrent second factor registration
requests and concurrent 2FA processes. The results of the experiments in both sets were
as expected.
The tests involving the three 2FA technologies (TOTP, Phone Prompt, and FIDO2)
considered the successful registration of one or more devices in the same or different
user accounts, and simultaneous registrations by different users and devices, for example,
three users from the same IdP, using three different smartphones or FIDO2 keys, simul-
taneously register the second factor successfully. There were also tests involving timeouts
in both registration and authentication, and attempts of reusing generated authentication
credentials. All the results from the test cases turned out as expected.
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We have also performed some experiments to evaluate the SP behavior when handling
2FA in four different scenarios: (1) SP requires second factor authentication and user has
registered a second factor at his/her IdP; (2) SP requires second factor authentication and
user has not registered a second factor at his/her IdP; (3) SP does not require second
factor authentication and user has registered a second factor at his/her IdP; (4) SP does
not require second factor authentication and user has not registered a second factor at
his/her IdP. Notice that scenario #4 corresponds to the traditional federation authentica-
tion where both SP and IdP only deals with a single authentication factor. Nevertheless,
we have included this scenario in order to test whether the inclusion of 2FA with MFaP
would affect the normal operation of IdPs. All scenarios were performed varying the 2FA
technology being employed when suitable to do so. For example, scenario #2 does not
require a second factor by the user, which receives an error message explaining that the SP
requires a second factor authentication. The results of the experiments were as expected.
In the second experimental phase, we have prepared a pilot plan to evaluate the inte-
gration of the MFaP in the IdPs (certification and testing environment) from the UFBA
and the RNP. After conducting the tasks of the plan, a preliminary satisfaction evaluation
has been performed with the participants. Due to the sensitive nature of the authentica-
tion service in the institution, these tasks were performed by the IdP operators and UFBA
technical personnel, which restricted the study to only seven participants. Nevertheless,
given their experience with day-to-day operations of the IdP and user support, we believe
that they were able to provide valuable insight on how to improve our solution.
When asked how often they authenticated themselves using a second factor, 57%
responded that they only did it to experiment with the technology while the remaining
43% used it on a daily basis. We have also asked their opinion on the ease of use for each
second factor technology, with the results presented in Fig. 6.
We can notice a strong indication about the ease of the TOTP usage, with all responses
being between normal and very easy. Phone prompt has also been well received by the
participants, with only one of them answering that it was hard to use. On the other hand,
Fig. 6 Results of the easy of use question from the satisfaction survey conducted with technicians of UFBA
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we can notice that the use of the FIDO2 USB stick is considered as “not easy” by almost
all participants.
When asked about problems found during authentication, 85% of participants indi-
cated that they faced some type of error. As for the reasons, five participants indicated
problems with the FIDO2 USB stick, with one answer about errors in the TOTP appli-
cation (Google Authenticator) in an iOS device, but a successful authentication using the
freeOTP application, and one with an error in the generated QRCode image.
All received feedback have been taken on-board by the development team resulting in
several improvements to our solution. In particular FIDO2, the feedback allowed us to
identify several improvements regarding its documentation, mainly considering that this
is a new technology that the majority of users are not familiar with. Another comment
provided some improvements to the Web dashboard interface for managing the different
factors. Concerning the problems with TOTP, we have identified that the Google Authen-
ticator for iOS did not work properly if the optional parameter “algorithm” was added to
the URI. Removing that parameter solved the issue. In general, the pilot results indicate
that the established requirements (easy MFaP deployment and code updating) were met,
while the satisfaction evaluation results were helpful to improve the usability of the MFaP
dashboard and the mobile app.
5.3 Security considerations
This section presents a discussion about some security considerations on MFaP. Four
different types of technologies were proposed to be used as an extra authentication factor
for the users’ IdP. Thus we detail possible attacks on each technology and to the whole
solution, that includes the interactions between Shibboleth IdP and MFaP.
We start by considering the MFaP application. The REST API provided by MFaP
requires a client authentication and it only relies on HTTPS protocol. Moreover, MFaP
is a Java application that can be deployed in the same application server where Shibbo-
leth IdP is already deployed (recommended option). As the MFaP REST API is consumed
only by the IdP, it can be limited to the localhost interface to reduce the attack surface. In
that case, a remote attacker will not be able to capture any packet exchanged between the
MFaP and the IdP.
In the sequence we present some consideration for each of the implemented 2FA tech-
nologies. For all scenarios in the next subsections, we assumed an attacker who already
compromised the victim’s first factor, that is, the attacker already has the user’s username
and password.
5.3.1 Phone prompt
An attacker will only be able to personify a victim if the attacker has access to the victim’s
device, where the Phone Prompt application is enabled.
Considering that a victim is not trying to get an authentication at an IdP, an attacker,
after a successful first authentication, is able to send authentication request notifica-
tions to the victim’s device with the intention to make the victim confirm the second
authentication step and consequently have access to the MFaP dashboard.
If the distracted victim clicks the “Yes” button, the attacker will then gain access to the
victim account and could access theMFaP Dashboard to disable the victim’s second factor
authentication or even to register a new device to act as a second factor. If the attacker
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successfully remove the second factor, the victim will lose access to the account and will
receive a notification informing about the second factor removal. Therefore, the victim
can quickly become aware that the account was compromised and can take the proper
measures to restore the authentication factors.
It is important to highlight that if the user did not initiate a 2FA authentication, he/she
should always click the “No” button to avoid this type of attack.
Considering that the aware victim is under attack, he/she can use the Phone prompt
application feature to block subsequent notifications for one hour. Meanwhile, the user
or the administrator has time to change the compromised password for a new one.
MFaP uses FCM to send notifications to the Phone Prompt application (see Sub-
section 3.2). All communications between MFAP and FCM, or between FCM and the
user’s smartphone, rely on the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol [31]. Thus,
confidentiality and integrity properties are granted by the TLS.
When the user enters his/her username and password, MFaP sends a notification
through FCM to the user’s device and the IdP login web page shows the message “wait-
ing. . . continue on your phone” (see Fig. 4). Thismessage will be there until the user’s device
sends a response message through the FCM to the MFaP or until the time expires (one
minute). In this case, the user should try again with Phone prompt or with a different
technology (i.e. TOTP, backup codes, etc).
Each message sent by the MFaP has a nonce, the category (e.g., register, unregister or
authentication) and a code (e.g., 200 OK, 302 FAIL, etc). The message sent by the user’s
device should include the nonce received from theMFaP, otherwise theMFaP will discard
it. All messages sent by the MFaP have a collapse key that identifies a group of messages
that can be collapsed by the FCM queue service. That is, the FCM will send only the last
message with a given collapse key (if the user’s device is not connected) to user’s device.
The maximum message lifespan was set to one minute, after that, the message expires
and the FCM will not delivery it to the user’s device or to the MFaP.
If the attacker starts several authentication requests in parallel, the MFaP will send just
onemessage for the first authentication request and the other authentication requests will
not generate new notifications on the victim’s device. That is, even under attack, theMFaP
will send at most one message per minute to the victim’s device. This behaviour protects
the whole solution from a potential flood attack. However, the victim might not be able
to use Phone Prompt if the attack takes a long period. If the victim uses the backup code,
which is always available in the MFaP, he/she will not be subject to the denial of service
attack.
5.3.2 Time-based one-time password
According to security considerations from RFC 6238 [11], all communications should
take place over a secure channel (i.e. TLS), the shared key should be chosen using a strong
pseudo-random generator and a time-step size of 30 s. In our implementation, we fol-
lowed all of these recommendations. The IdP’s login web page, the place where the user
has to provide the one-time-password, relies on HTTPS.
To bypass the TOTP, a remote attacker has to capture the shared key used by the MFaP
and the user. During the TOTP registration process, the MFaP shows a web page that
contains a QR Code image representing a shared key for the TOTP. The user has to use a
TOTP application on his/her smartphone to read this QR Code. The shared key could be
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leaked to a remote attacker only if he/she previously implanted a malware on the victim’s
phone. Thus, this malware should be able to read theQRCode image present on theMFaP
registration web page. The possibility for this kind of attack is remote, but plausible.
5.3.3 FIDO2
According to FIDO2 specifications [12], the user’s credentials are unique for each user
account and across different IdPs. They never leave the user’s device and are never stored
on an IdP or MFaP. Thus, the same FIDO2 device could be used by a user in different
accounts, on the same or different IdPs, and it will not leak any information that can be
used by the IdP to track him/her. A remote attacker is not able to capture the user’s cre-
dentials and the user presence test [12] makes malware attacks unpractical on the user’s
device.
5.3.4 Backup codes
Each backup code can be used just once and it is provided on the IdP authentication
web page, that relies on HTTPS. On our current implementation, backup codes are 8
digit numbers, generated using the same algorithm that is used to generate TOTP codes,
and the IdP web page limits the number of attempts and also introduces a delay between
subsequent attempts to reduce the effectiveness of a force brute attack. Thus, the main
risks associated with this technology is a malware installed on the user’s computer that
can have access to the backup codes file, or a careless user who may lose or delete this file.
6 Conclusion
This article presented a multi-factor authentication provider (MFaP) for Shibboleth Iden-
tity Providers. TheMFaP is based on SAMLMFA Profile to extend the IdP authentication
flows and it can be easily integrated to existing IdPs. To the best of our knowledge, our
solution is the first comprehensive open source solution that does not rely on third-party
services. Our approach supports the use of different technologies as second authentica-
tion factors, allowing each user to set single or multi authentication factors, and which
technologies can be used as extra factors.
MFaP comprises a set of components for managing authentication factors, aWeb-based
GUI allowing the management of 2FA technologies by IdP operators, and a self-service
portal for end users. We have also developed a mobile app (AMPToAPP) that can be
immediately used by any institution who wishes to deploy MFaP into its IdP.
MFaP has been evaluated by means of a comprehensive test plan and pilots using IdP
operators from different Brazilian institutions. These included not only the normal oper-
ation of the solution, but also its installation, maintenance and update. Furthermore, we
have performed a security analysis of the solution.
Although we have achieved significant results with MFaP, some limitations have been
identified. In its current implementation, we restricted the FIDO2 USB token to one per
user, per IdP. This still allows a user to reuse the same USB token in different IdPs, but
does not allow scenarios where a user might have two or more tokens in the same IdP, for
example, a backup token as means of recovery. The pilot experiments provided relevant
feedback, but all participant users had technical knowledge, not representing the majority
of IdP users.
We are currently planning a new deployment of our solution with a larger number of
active users. In fact, we envision the realization of a more comprehensive set of usability
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experiments, exploring a population with diverse levels of IT knowledge, age range, etc.
We also plan on implementing and experimenting with other FIDO2 specifications, such
as the use of other FIDO2 devices as second authentication factor.
Finally, we also suggest an in-depth solution threat analysis considering the Shibboleth
IdP integrated with the MFaP, the dashboard, and mobile apps. An academic cybersecu-
rity competition or challenge could be organized to identify some vulnerabilities in the
proposed solution including the open-source software analysis.
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